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Evgenia Mochenkova
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Current Affiliation:
Assistant Professor
VU University Amsterdam
Department of Economics (feweb)
De Boelelaan 1105 / 2A-37
1081 HV Amsterdam
tel. +31-(0)20-5987143
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Personal Information:
Name: Evgenia Motchenkova
Date of Birth: January 17, 1978
Place of Birth: Saint-Petersburg, Russia
PhD degree obtained on November 11, 2005
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Research Interests:
General: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial
Organization, Law and Economics, Antitrust, Competition policy and
regulation, Mathematical economics, Dynamic games.
Specific: Economics of crime, Analysis of optimal
policies for deterrence of antitrust law violations, Optimal leniency
schemes, The effects of leniency programs on the behavior of the firms
participating in cartel agreements, Dynamic models of optimal law
enforcement.
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Education:
2001/08 - 2005/08: Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and
Operations Research, The Netherlands.
PhD student at CentER and TILEC.
Title of the PhD Dissertation: Optimal Enforcement of Competition Law,
Supervisors: Prof. Eric van Damme, Prof. Peter M. Kort.
1999/08 - 2001/06: University of Oslo,
Master degree in Environmental and Development Economics
1995/08 - 1999/06: Saint-Petersburg State University,
Master degree in Mathematical Economics
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Publications:
E. Motchenkova and Peter M.Kort, 2006. “Analysis
of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws”, Journal of Optimization Theory and
Applications, 128(2), 431-451.
Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2008. "Determination
of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting,"
European Journal of Operational
Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 269-291. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.05.048
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Working Papers and Projects:
Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2009. The
Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing, Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 09-081/1, Tinbergen
Institute (submitted to JEEA)
Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2008. "Maximal
Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs," Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers 08-120/1, Tinbergen Institute.
To Protect in order to Serve, adverse effects of leniency
programs in view of industry asymmetry Working paper, Free
University Amsterdam and TILEC, 2007, URL: TILEC
Discussion Paper Series 2007-007
Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer bargaining in the Netherlands
Joint
project with CTG-Zaio, Working paper, Free University Amsterdam
and TILEC, 2007 (submitted to European Journal of Health Economics), URL:TILEC
Discussion Paper Series 2007-006
Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat
Offenders
Working paper, Free University Amsterdam, 2006 (submitted to Economics
Letters), URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/vuarem/2006-8.html
Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms
CentER Discussion paper 2005-74,URL:http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/kubcen/200574.html
(submitted to Journal of Economics)
Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability
CentER Discussion paper 2004-98, URL:CentER Discussion
paper series 2004-98 (submitted
to JEMS)
Assignment games, core and market power, with
Y. Funaki and H. Houba, mimeo
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Other publications:
H. Houba, E. Motchenkova and
Q. Wen, 2009, The Maximal Damage Paradigm in
Antitrust Regulation: Is it Something New?, AENORM 16,
gemeenschappelijke uitgave econometriestudieverenigingen Kraket/VSAE, Vrije
Universiteit/Universiteit van Amsterdam, p.37-41.
Promoting small-scale private enterprises in Russia: the problem of
excessive taxation, Proceedings of the Workshop on Reviving
Russian Economy through the restructuring of incentives, 2001. St-Petersburg,
Russia, pp. 7-10
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